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Report of the
December, 1935, Conference
THE NATIONAL ASSOCIATION
TAX ADMINISTRATORS
INDIANAPOLIS, INDIANA
December 3 and 4, 1935
OF
FOREWORDIN PREPARING this report for publication, we have attempted
to arrange the material in a manner that will make it most
useful to tax administrators and others interested in tax
matters.
To readers of the report who are not members of the Asso-
ciation it perhaps should be pointed out that the majority of
articles contained herein are extemporaneous talks rather than
prepared papers. We believe that whatever this form of expres-
sion may lose in polish it gains in frankness and freshness.
It will be noted that in the discussions printed at the close
of the articles, there is a frequent difference of opinion among
the administrators. These questions and answers represent the
fulfillment of one of the foremost purposes of the National
Association of Tax Administrators-to provide an open forum
for free discussion of tax problems among those who must
administer the tax laws of our country.
Organized in 1934 as the National Association of State
Tax Administrators, the word "State" was dropped from the
title by vote of the Association at the 1935 conference, and
membership restrictions were extended in order that other tax
officials might be eligible to membership.
C. A. JACKSON,
Secretary-Treasurer.
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CaliFornia AdoptsUse Ta x
Protect Local Trade
With Security of Interstate Commerce Established, Action is Necessary to Remove
Inequalities Suffered by Domestic Commerce, Author of Law Says
By ROGER J. TRAYNOR*
Member of the Faculty of the University
of California and Consultant to
the California State Board
of Equalization
HE Commerce Clause of the Fed-
eral Constitution has served the
development of interstate com-
merce long and well. The security of
such commerce is now as firmly estab-
lished as the unity of the nation, yet its
special privileges continue even though
the original reasons for them have dis-
appeared. The tables are now turned,
with domestic commerce in the less se-
cure position. While hitherto maintain-
ing itself under discriminatory tax bur-
dens, it now struggles under their addi-
tional weight at a time when even slight
differentials may make or break a busi-
ness. All losses of local business to out-
side competitors result in losses of
revenue not recouped by other states, for
the corresponding gains to interstate busi-
ness escape taxation altogether. More
serious, however, is the permanent impair-
ment of local business, which is at best
only partially counterbalanced by in-
creased orders from other states. (See
the excellent study by E. M. Perkins,
The Sales Tax and Transactions in Inter-
state Commerce, 12 North Carolina Law
Review 99.) The rapid development of
state sales taxation has rendered a serious
situation critical, and the need for a
remedy, which brought into being the
National Association of State Tax Ad-
ministrators, has become urgent. If state
sales taxation is to continue, states must
find some way of equalizing the competi-
tion which now threatens their sources
of revenue as it threatens their local
businesses.
*Mr. Traynor is Associate Professor of Law at the
University of California School of Jurisprudence,
Berkeley, California, and is faculty editor-in-chief
of the California Law Review. He was legal adviser
to the California Tax Research Bureau, State Board
of Equalization, from January, 1932, to August,
1933, when he became acting director of the Sales
Tax Division. He has been a consultant to the
State Board of Equalization since January, 1934.
The solution is in no sense to grant
special privileges to local business, but to
remove those special privileges from
interstate business. Three obstacles stand
in the way of such a solution: (1) re-
peated pronouncements by the United
States Supreme Court that the regulation
of commerce among the states, delegated
to Congress by the United States Consti-
tution, prohibits the application of state
excise taxes with respect to transactions
in interstate commerce; [Robbins v.
Shelby County Taxing District (1886)
120 U. S. 489; Statenburgh v. Hennick
(1889) 129 U. S. 141; Brennan v. Titus-
ville (1894) 153 U. S. 289; Stockard v.
Morgan (1902) 185 U. S. 27; Caldwell v.
North Carolina (1903) 187 U. S. 622;
Norfolk and Western Ry. Co. v. Sims
(1903) 191 U. S. 441; Rearick v. Penn-
sylvania (1906) 203 U. S. 507; Dozier v.
Alabama (1909) 218 U. S. 124; Cren-
shaw v. Arkansas (1912) 227 U. S. 389;
Rogers v. Arkansas (1912) 227 U. S.
401; Stewart v. Michigan (1913) 232 U.
S. 665; Davis v. Virginia (1914) 236 U.
S. 697; Real Silk Hosiery Mills v. Port-
land (1925) 268 U. S. 325.] (2) decisions
that a state cannot tax activities beyond
its borders; [St. Louis Cotton Compress
v. Arkansas (1922) 260 U. S. 346; Provi-
dent Savings Ass'n v. Kentucky (1915)
239 U. S. 103; Compania de Tabacos v.
Collector (1927) 275 U. S. 87; Stand-
ard Oil Co. v. California (1934) 291 U.
S. 242; Compare Palmetto Fire Insur-
ance Co. v. Conn (1926) 272 U. S. 295;
Graniteville Manufacturing Co. v. Query
(1931) 283 U. S. 376.] (3) restriction
of a state's collection functions to its own
limits. [See Colorado v. Harbeck (1921)
232 N. Y. 71, 133 N. E. 357; Moore v.
Mitchell (1929, C. C. A. 2d) 30 F. (2d)
600.]
Rate Same as Sales Tax
The California Use Tax Act (Cal.
Stats. 1935, ch. 361) takes account of
these conditions in its plan to put its own
retailers on the same terms with out-of-
state competitors. It imposes an excise
13
tax of 3% of the sales price upon the
storage, use or other consumption of tan-
gible personal property purchased from
retailers on or after July 1, 1935, for
storage, use or other consumption in the
state. The rate is thus identical with the
sales tax rate. The act does not apply
to property subject to the sales tax; it
thus directs itself principally to that
property purchased outside the state or
in interstate commerce, and applies re-
gardless of whether the retailer is located
in the state or in another state or foreign
country. Liability for the tax falls upon
the person storing, using or otherwise
consuming the property and is extin-
guished only when he pays the tax either
to the retailer from whom he must re-
ceive a receipt or to the state when the
retailer maintains no place of business in
the state. Retailers in the first instance
must collect the tax at the time of sale
and make quarterly returns thereof. In
all other cases the consumer must make
such returns directly. Retailers who
maintain no place of business in the state
are neither required to collect the tax nor
permitted to do so except upon certain
conditions. The State Board of Equali-
zation may require returns for other than
quarterly periods. All retailers making
sales of tangible personal property to
California consumers are required to
register with the Board.
It is the intent of the use tax merely
to supplement the sales tax by imposing
upon those subject to it a tax burden
equivalent to that of the sales tax with
the same specific exemptions in each
case. The act accordingly limits the tax
to the "use . . . of property purchased
for use . . ." within the state. Problems
requiring administrative interpretation
must be analyzed in the light of this
double condition. Circumstances might
compel, for example, the use of property
within the state not intended for such
use at the time of purchase, and previ-
ously used elsewhere. Thus a family
moving into California with furniture it
had used for several years would clearly
to
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be exempt from the tax. Cases can
arise, however, where a formal use else-
where might disguise an actual intent to
use within the state the property pur-
chased. For the most part such an in-
tent would reveal itself in the circum-
stances of the purchase and the subse-
quent use of the property. There could
be little doubt that the use tax would
apply to the use of an automobile pur-
chased in Nevada by a California resi-
dent and registered in California shortly
thereafter. Since the variety of possible
situations could hardly be covered by a
rigid rule or regulation doubtful cases
must be submitted to administrative
interpretation.
Legality First Question
The first question that arises is
whether the Act imposes an unconstitu-
tional burden upon interstate commerce
either by levying a discriminatory tax, by
charging certain retailers with collection,
or by taxing the use of property in an
interstate business.
It is now beyond doubt that the stor-
age, use or other consumption of tangible
personal property within the borders of a
state is a proper subject of an excise tax,
even though the property be of out-of-
state origin. [Bowman v. Continental Oil
Co. (1921) 256 U. S. 642; Hart Refiner-
ies v. Harmon (1929) 278 U. S. 499;
Nashville C. & St. L. R. R. Co. v. Wal-
lace (1933) 288 U. S. 249.] It might be
argued, however, that the exemption of
property subject to the sales tax consti-
tutes a prima facie discrimination against
interstate commerce. If the Act actually
discriminated against goods of out-of-
state origin, it would violate the com-
merce clause even though interstate
transit had ceased and the goods had long
since come to rest in the state. [Welton
v. Missouri (1875) 91 U. S. 275; Bethle-
hem Motors Corporation v. Flynt (1921)
256 U. S. 421. See also Darnell & Son v.
Memphis (1908) 208 U. S. 113.] If dis-
crimination were to be determined solely
from the four corners of the Act, there
could be little doubt of its invalidity.
The Supreme Court, however, repudiated
this test in Gregg Dyeing Co. v. Query,
[(1932) 286 U. 5. 472. See also Vancou-
ver Oil Co. v. Henneford (1935) 49 P.
(2d) 14 holding valid, in reliance upon
the Gregg Case a Washington tax essen-
tially similar to the California use tax.]
holding that other related statutes must
be considered in conjunction with the
one assailed as discriminatory. That case
involved the validity of a South Carolina
license tax upon gasoline imported from
other states, and stored for future use
within the state. Other South Carolina
statutes imposed license taxes with
respect to sales of gasoline within the
state. The court declared:
"But appellants question the right to
invoke other statutes to support the
validity of the act assailed. To stand the
test of constitutionality, they say, the
act must be constitutional 'within its
four corners' that is, considered by itself.
The question of constitutional validity is
not to be determined by artificial stand-
ards. What is required is that state
action, whether through one agency or
another, or through one enactment or
more than one, shall be consistent with
the restrictions of the Federal Constitu-
tion. There is no demand in that Con-
stitution that the state shall put its re-
quirements in any one statute. It may
distribute them as it sees fit, if the re-
sult, taken in its totality, is within the
state's constitutional power." (286 U. S.
472, 479)
Gregg Case Meets Objection
The California Use Tax operates in
conjunction with the sales tax to exact
from all consumers of tangible personal
property within the state a tax amounting
to 3% of the sale price of the property.
The fact that the sales tax is in form
upon the retailer, while the use tax is in
form upon the consumer, affords no basis
for distinguishing the Gregg case, since
there was virtually the same difference
between the South Carolina statutes in-
volved in that case. Unless particular
significance is attached to the fact that
the latter statutes involved only one
commodity, or to the special nature of
that commodity, the Gregg case effec-
tively meets the contention that the Cali-
fornia Use Tax involves a forbidden dis-
rimination by exempting property reached
by the sales tax.
Even though the California Use Tax
Act involves no unconstitutional discrim-
ination in the light of the Gregg Case,
the question remains whether it can
constitutionally charge with tax collec-
tion those retailers maintaining a place
of business within the state. Only by
this method could the Act obviate the
insuperable difficulties of collecting the
tax exclusively from the numberless users
of diverse commodities, and it finds
authority for such a method in the re-
cent Supreme Court decision in Mona-
motor Oil Company v. Johnson, [(1934)
292 U. 5. 86. See also the cases holding
that a state may require a national bank
to collect a tax on shareholders that could
not have been imposed upon the bank.
Nat. Bank v. Commonwealth (1869) 76
U. S. (9 Wall.) 353; First Nat. Bank of
Aberdeen v. County of Chehalis (1897)
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166 U. S. 440; Merchants and Man-
facturers' Nat. Bank v. Penn (1897) 147
U. S. 461; Home Saving Bank v. Des
Moines (1907) 205 U. S. 503. See also
Pierce Oil Co. v. Hopkins (1924) 264 U.
S. 137 holding that a state statute re-
quiring sellers of gasoline to collect a
tax from their purchasers did not violate
due process.] This case involved an
Iowa statute requiring all distributors to
collect a tax on the use of gasoline, re-
gardless of whether the gasoline was sold
interstate or intrastate. The court held
that:
"The appellant, however, says that the
state officials have required it to report
and pay the tax on shipments made from
Oklahoma direct to dealers in Iowa who
are appellant's customers and in respect
to such transactions the burden on inter-
state commerce is obvious. But if the
gasoline so imported is intended to be
used in Iowa for motor vehicle fuel it is
subject to tax . . . The statute obvi-
ously was not intended to reach trans-
actions in interstate commerce, but to
tax the use of motor vehicle fuel after it
had come to rest in Iowa, and the re-
quirement that the appellant as shipper
into Iowa shall, as agent of the state, re-
port and pay the tax on the gasoline thus
coming into the state for use by others
on whom the tax falls imposes no uncon-
stitutional burden either upon interstate
commerce or upon the appellant." (292
U. S. 8 6, 94.)
Trend in Decisions Noted
It may be that in subjecting to a use
tax that which could not be reached by
a sales tax and in requiring a seller to
collect the tax to which he himself could
not be subjected the California Use Tax
resorts to a measure of indirection. But
the netessity of harmonizing the equitable
purposes of the Act with established
precedents compels the careful selection
of its subject and the manner of its im-
position. The act would seem particu-
larly free from criticism on this ground
in view of recent decisions evidencing a
growing severity toward the special boun-
ties enjoyed by interstate commerce. [See
Wiloil Corp. v. Pennsylvania (1935) 294
U. 5. 169. See also Eastern Air Trans-
port Inc. v. South Carolina Tax Comm
(1932) 285 U. 5. 147; Nashville etc. Ry
Co. v. Wallace (1933) 288 U. S. 249;
Edelman v. Boeing Air Transport Inc,
(1933) 289 U. S. 249.]
The commerce clause raises onemr
constitutional question with regard t~th
use tax, rgamely, its application V
use or storage of property shse
used in interstate commerce. If
use of the property withinthe
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use in interstate commerce the tax would
seem clearly inapplicable under the
holdings in Helson & Randolph v. Ken-
tucky [(1929) 279 U. S. 245) and
Cooney v. Mountain States Telephone
Co. (1935) 294 U. S. 384.] The Helson
case held that a Kentucky tax on the sale,
distribution or use of gasoline within the
state could not apply to gasoline pur-
chased outside the state, never stored
therein, and used exclusively in inter-
state commerce. The Cooney Case inval-
idated a license tax on telephone com-
panies measured by the number of tele-
phones in intrastate use on the ground
that all of the telephones were available
and substantially used in interstate com-
merce. The Helson case involved a use
in interstate commerce not preceded by
any storage or local use in the state. The
Cooney Case involved a use which might
have been preceded by storage or local
use neither of which, however, were sub-
ject to the tax.
California Act Specific
The California Act, on the contrary,
specifically taxes such storage or use.
The validity of such taxation was sus-
tained in Nashville, Chattanooga etc. Ry.
v. Wallace and Edelman v. Boeing Air
Transport Company. [see Wiloil Corp.
v. Pennsylvania (1935) 294 U. S. 169.
See also Eastern Air Transport Inc. v.
South Carolina Tax Comm. (1932) 285
U. S. 147; Nashville etc. Ry. Co. v.
Wallace (1933) 288 U. S. 249; Edelman
v. Boeing Air Transport Inc. (1933)
288 U. S. 249; Edelman v. Boeing Air
Transport Inc. (1933) 289 U. S. 249.)
In the Nashville Case an interstate
carrier purchased gasoline outside the
.state, stored it within the state and later
withdrew it for use in interstate carriage.
The court held it subject to a privilege
tax on persons and corporations engaged
in the business of selling, storing or dis-
tributing gasoline in the state on the
ground that the power to tax the gasoline
as property after coming to rest in the
state includes the power to tax its stor-
age and withdrawal. The court said:
"Here the tax is imposed on the suc-
cessive exercise of two of those powers,
the storage and withdrawal from storage
of the gasoline. Both powers are com-
pletely exercised before the use of gaso-
line as an instrument of commerce and
the burden is too indirect and remote
from the function of interstate commerce
itself to transgress constitutional limita-
tions." (288 U. 5. 249, 268.)
A similar use of gasoline in the Edel-
man Case was held subject to a tax on
the use or sale of gasoline in the state.
In holding that this tax imposed no un-
constitutional burden on interstate com-
merce the court stated
"As the tax has been administratively
construed and applied, the tax is not
levied upon the consumption of gasoline
in furnishing motive power for respond-
ent's interstate planes. The tax is applied
to the stored gasoline as it is withdrawn
from the storage tanks at the airport and
placed in the planes. No tax is collected
for gasoline consumed in respondent's
planes either on coming into the state or
on going out. It is at the time of with-
drawal alone that 'use' is measured for
the purpose of the tax. The stored gaso-
line is deemed to be 'used' within the
state and therefore subject to the tax,
when it is withdrawn from the tanks . . .
"A state may validly tax the 'use' to
which gasoline is put in withdrawing it
from storage within the state, and plac-
ing it in the tanks of the planes, not-
withstanding that its ultimate function
is to generate motive power for carrying
on interstate commerce." (289 U. S.
249, 251.)
The Helson Case would clearly pre-
vent the application of a use tax only
where the interstate use, as in the case of
rolling stock, preceded the introduction
of the property into the state and con-
tinued thereafter. It seems clear in the
Nashville and Edelman Cases, however,
that once property has come to rest in
the state, acts up to the very point of
consumption were regarded as preliminary
to the interstate use held not taxable in
the Helson Case, and were not themselves
immune from taxation. If the withdrawal
of gasoline and the filling of tanks for
immediate use in interstate commerce
can be subjected to use taxation it is
difficult to see how the storage or for
that matter the installation of tangible
personal property could be immune.
Limitation Avoids Problems
The limitation of the use tax to the
storage, use or other consumption of
property within the state avoids the
problems of due process that might arise
from the extension of a sales tax by con-
sumer states, to interstate commerce
under federal permissive legislation or
otherwise. The privilege of selling and
the act of sale would probably be located
in the state of origin of the commodity
thus rendering the selection of any other
subject of a sales tax in the consuming
state of dubious constitutionality. [St.
Louis Cotton Compress v. Arkansas
(1922) 260 U. 5. 346; Provident Savings
Ass'n v. Kentucky (1915), 239 U. S.
103; Compania de Tabacos v. Collector
(1927) 275 U. 5. 87; Standard Oil Co.
v. California (1934) 291 U. S. 242;
15
Compare Palmetto Fire Insurance Co. v.
Conn. (1926) 272 U. S. 295; Granite-
ville Manufacturing Co. v. Query (1931)
283 U. S. 376.] In contrast, the storage,
use or other consumption of property
within a state is clearly within its juris-
diction to tax. [See Air Transport Inc.
v. South Carolina Tax Comm.; Nashville
etc. Ry. Co. v. Wallace; Edelman v. Boe-
ing Air Transport Inc., (1933) 289 U.
S. 249. See also Palmetto Fire Ins. Co.
v. Conn.; Graniteville Mfg. Co. v. Query
(1931) 283 U. S. 376; Bowman v. Con-
tinental Oil Co. (1921) 256 U. S. 642;
Hart Refineries v. Harmon (1929) 278
U. S. 499; Nashville C. & St. L. R. R.
Co. v. Wallace (1933) 288 U. S. 249.]
Property Tax, May Be Claim
It might be argued that the use tax is
a property tax which, by virtually limit-
ing itself to property of out-of-state
origin, violates not only the commerce
clause, but the uniformity provision of
the state constitution. This interpreta-
tion of the use tax would look for its
authority to Dawson v. Kentucky Distil-
leries Co. [(1924) 255 U. S. 288.] The
court there held that a tax on the re-
moval of whiskey from bonded ware-
houses in the state violated the uniform-
ity provision of the Kentucky constitu-
tion. It declared:
"The whole value of the whiskey de-
pends upon the owner's right to get it
from the place where the law has com-
pelled him to put it, and to tax the
right is to tax the value. To levy a tax
by reason of ownership of property is to
tax the property." (255 U. S. 288, 294.)
In Bromley v. McCaughn, [(1929)
280 U. S. 138. See also Anderson v. Mc-
Neir (1927) 16 F (2d) 970, 974] how-
ever, the court sustained a federal gift
tax against the contention that it was a
property tax necessitating apportionment,
on the ground that "a tax imposed upon
a particular use of property or the exer-
cise of a single power over property inci-
dental to ownership is an excise which
need not be apportioned." It contrasted
this with the Dawson Case, holding that
the latter supported the proposition
that a tax "upon all the uses to which
property may be put, or upon the exer-
cise of a single power indispensable to
the enjoyment of all the others, would
be in effect a tax upon the property."
The Dawson case thus raises certain
questions. Upon how many uses could a
tax be levied without becoming a prop-
erty tax? What uses would be indis-
pensable to the enjoyment of all others?
The interpretation of the use tax as a
property tax was not advanced in any of
the cases involving taxes on use or stor-
~KAI
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age. In any event, the California use
tax does not apply to the use or storage
of property to be resold, nor does it
have the usual characteristics of a prop-
erty tax. It does not recur annually, but
falls only once on any specific property;
it is not imposed on a fixed day; it
does not, in other words, fall upon the
owner "merely because he is owner, re-
gardless of the use or disposition made
of the property."
Even if it were a property tax it
would still not constitute a discrimina-
tion against interstate commerce, in the
light of the Gregg Case, so long as other
taxes, property or otherwise, imposed a
comparable burden upon domestic com-
merce. The second contention raised by
the interpretation of the tax as a prop-
erty tax would have no application in
California, where the uniformity pro-
vision of the state constitution does not
apply to personal property.
Collection Biggest Task
The most difficult problem for a state,
however, is not the establishment of a
non-discriminatory tax within its own
jurisdiction, but the collection of such a
tax. Any attempt to collect a use tax
from countless individual users of com-
modities would involve so much super-
vision and expense as to vitiate the exer-
cise of a state's jurisdiction over them.
The users might have a clear responsi-
bility for tax payment, but they could
evade it by virtue of their numbers. The
imposition of responsibility on a smaller
group, however, would be equally inef-
fective if the state had no jurisdiction to
enforce collection. While it would be
desirable, for example, to localize collec-
tion through a comparatively small
group of retailers, this would be pre-
cluded, since the members of such a
group are subject to different jurisdic-
tions. If a retailer had no place of
business in the taxing state, he could be
compelled neither to pay a tax imposed
upon him nor to collect a tax imposed
upon his local customers. A state could
not normally send its officers into another
state to audit the books of a retailer. It
would probably find no remedy in its
courts if the retailer had no attachable
property within the state. It might thus
be in the embarrassing position of re-
questing, tax payments from out-of-state
retailers which it could not collect in the
event of refusal. Such a situation
would be particularly undesirable where
domestic consumers had themselves paid
the tax to the retailers for remittance to
the state.
The California use tax seeks to obvi-
ate these difficulties by localizing collec-
tion through retailers, but only so far as
is consistent with its own jurisdiction. It
requires collection from consumers on
behalf of the state only from retailers
maintaining places of business within the
state, or others who upon proper show-
ing have obtained the consent of the
State Board of Equalization to collect the
tax. While it is thus still compelled to
exact tax payments directly from those
purchasers from retailers without places
of business within the state, it at least
limits that group to a size susceptible to
effective administration.
A ct Provides for Service
In regard to civil actions for the en-
forcement of collection, the California
act provides for service of process upon
any agent or clerk employed in the state
by any retailer in a place of business
maintained by such retailer in the state,
and the transmission by registered mail
of a copy of the process to the retailer
at his home office. The validity of such
service upon a corporation engaged
exclusively in interstate commerce, at
least regarding those whose activities in
the state transcend mere solicitation of
orders, is assured by International Har-
vester Co. v. Kentucky. [(1916) 234 U.
S. 579.] Quite recently Henry L. Doherty
& Co. v. Goodman [(1935) 55 Sup. Ct.
553. See J. P. McBaine, Service upon a
Non-Resident by Service Upon His Agent
(1935) 23 California Law Review 482.]
removed the doubts left by Holmes'
opinion in Flexner v. Farson [(1919) 248
U. S. 289] regarding the validity of
service upon a non-resident by service
upon his agent. While the case did not
involve interstate commerce, it would
seem that once the propriety of service
upon a non-resident by service upon his
agent is established, the interstate char-
acter of the business should no more
obstruct service upon individuals than
service upon corporations. Once proper
service is had, a judgment obtained in
this state might form, although the ques-
tion is still open, the basis of an action
in the courts of another state. [See
Wisconsin v. Pelican Ins. Co. (1888) 127
U. 5. 265; Moore v. Mitchell (1929) 30
F. (2d) 600. Cf. People of State of New
York v. Coe Mfg. Co. (1934) 112 N. J.
L. 536, 172 Atl. 198, cert. den. (1934)
55 Sup. Ct. 89; (1935) 83 U. of Pa. L.
Rev. 387; Hazelwood, Full Faith and
Credit Clause as Applied to Enforce-
ment of Tax Judgments (1934) 19 Mar-
quette L. Rev. 10.) The Act is addi-
tionally implemented in this regard by
making the tax to be collected by re-
tailers a debt owing to the state, thus
again attempting to meet the doctrine
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that one state cannot sue for taxes in
the courts of another.
Reciprocation May Be Answer
The California Use Tax Act seeks by
unilateral action to circumvent difficulties
that might well be facilitated or abolished
altogether by reciprocal action among
the states. North Carolina has taken an
excellent step in this direction by mak-
ing its courts available for the enforce-
ment of collection to any other states
which would reciprocate that privilege.
(1935) (North Carolina H. B. 332.)
Much might also be accomplished by the
exchange of similar privileges that
seemed essential to effective tax collec-
tion. As matters now stand, even if the
states, in order to subject interstate and
intrastate commerce to the same bur-
dens, had the power to tax all sales
directly, they would still lack jurisdiction
to enforce collection. Federal legislation
itself could do little to remedy this sit-
uation without co-operative action from
the states. No group could more appro-
priately encourage such reciprocal legis-
lation than the National Association of
Tax Administrators.
MR. SMITH (Missouri): Have California
courts passed on your Use Tax Law yet?
PROFESSOR TRAYNOR: No, but Washington
has a similar tax and the Washington Supreme
Court has passed upon that Act, holding it
valid so far as the State Constitution is con-
cerned and so far as interstate commerce is
concerned. That is in Vancouver Oil Com-
pany against Henneford. It is in 49th Pacific.
MR. SMITH: Another question: If I un-
derstood you correctly, if Mrs. Blivins, out
here at Podunk, orders some red house slip-
pers and a calico dress from Montgomery
Ward & Company, in Chicago, you make an
effort to collect that tax?
PROFESSOR TRAYNOR: Yes, she is supposed
to return that tax to California, just as if she
had bought it from a California retailer.
MR. REYNOLDS (Michigan): Professor, you
mean to say that from each individual in
California who orders from a mail order house
in Chicago, an attempt is made by the state
to collect that tax?
PROFESSOR TRAYNOR: That is right.
MR. REYNOLDS: From all individuals?
PROFESSOR TRAYNOR: That is right.
MR. REYNOLDS: I should think that that
would be rather prohibitive.
PROFESSOR TRAYNOR: I expect it would be
very difficult. It is undoubtedly a heroic task.
MR. PIERCE (California): As Professor
Traynor pointed out, where that retailer
maintains a place of business in the state, the
law makes him responsible for the collection
of it and, in the case of the two principal
mail order houses--that is, Montgomery
Ward and Sears-Roebuck-of course, they do
maintain places of business in our state, retail
stores. So, answering specifically Mr. Smith's
question, in that case it would have been
collected directly from the retailer and there
would be no difficulty at all.
MR. REYNOLDS: Even if they maintai fl
branch in the state, yout still attempt to col-
lect it
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MR. PIERCE: Where they have no branch
in the state at all, as Professor Traynor said
in his paper, then the problem is different be-
cause it would be useless to try to collect it
from the seller in the other state, particularly
where no tax liability would be in dispute in
the other state.
PROFESSOR TRAYNOR: I think we have a
sufficient number of retailers with places of
business in the state to render this difficult
problem workable. The large users of prop-
erty, like the various corporations and utility
companies and so forth,-render the collection
otherwise rather simple. So that reduces the
users that we attempt to collect the tax from
to a less formidable number, but I do recog-
nize the force of that question. It is a very
difficult problem; however, perhaps no more
so that collecting an income tax. Many ob-
jections were made to the personal income
tax on the same ground: that you ask indi-
viduals to make returns and tell you what
their income is. Now, in time, I suppose that
the force of that objection will be met just as
it was in the case of the income tax.
Law Not in Courts
MR. SMIrrH: May I ask if you have had
any difficulty in collecting this tax or has any-
one resorted to the courts to stop you from
collecting it ?
PROFESSOR TRAYNOR: Not yet, no.
MR. SMrrT: Now, the mail order house-
the main house in Chicago-will notify its
branch house in California that they have
shipped a dress to Mrs. Blivins, at Podunk-
is that the way it is handled-or that they
have sold three dollars and forty-five cents
worth of merchandise to her?
PROFESSOR TRAYNOR: The mail order branch
in California is required to make the return.
MR. SMITH: And they get the information
from the house in Chicago?
PROFESSOR TRAYNOR: Yes, that is right.
MR. MARTIN (New Jersey): I would like
to ask if you can tell us whether there are any
cases now pending in the Federal Court
where the parties are carrying either the Cali-
fornia or the Washington Use Tax to the
United States Supreme Court.
PROFEssOR TRAYNOR: I think the Washing-
ton tax is going up, but I am not positive.
MR. : I would like to ask, Profes-
sor, what the penalty is in connection with
this question of filing of returns, as far as
the consumer is concerned, if the consumer
fails to file a return.
MR. PIERCE: There is a ten per cent penalty.
MR. -: Do you have a provision for
civil action?
MR. PIERCE: Yes, there is a provision for
civil action, too.
Branch Office Liable
MR. Surrm (Georgia): I don't know
whether Mr. Smith, of Missouri, made that
exactly clear, or not
In. the event property is sent from Sears-
Roebuck & Company, at Chicago, and it is
shipped direct from Sears-Roebuck & Com-
pany, Chicago, to the customer in California,
then you, under your law, attempt to hold the
branch office of Sears-Roebuck & Company,
in California, responsible ?
*PROFESSOR TRAYNOR: That is right. Yes,
our theory is that, so far as possible, the tax
must be collected from retailers because of
the contention that has just been made, which
lies back of the questions, I think, that have
been asked: The insuperable job of collecting
it from countless numbers of users. So, so
far as possible, we attempt, and are relying
upon this case of Monamotor Oil Company
against Johnson to get the tax from retailers
because it is obviously easier to get it from a
hundred retailers than it is from ten thousand
customers.
We didn't want to be faced with the em-
barrassing situation of requiring the retailer
to collect it and have that retailer say, "Get
the tax from the consumer," and then coming
to Chicago or Indiana with a demand for the
tax and have him tell us that we were not
going to get it. We would be remediless. It
would have been a very embarrassing and
insufferable situation. So, in the process of
drafting this legislation, we hit upon the
plan of confining this obligation of collect-
ing the tax, or the privilege of collecting it-
some retailers want to do it-only to those
who have a place of business in the state.
Now, the object of that is, first, to get
jurisdiction over such retailer so that service
of process can be had when we get a judg-
ment against him and, secondly, so that he
would have taxable values in the state that
we could attach and levy execution on in
support of that judgment.
Now, those are the big reasons back of it.
The State of California has the privilege of
entering and auditing the books, say, of Sears-
Roebuck & Company, to make sure that the
sales, which have been through the home
office, are reported by the branch office.
I do think, however, if the law is to work
as effectively as is set out within its own pro-
visions, reciprocal legislation is going to be
required, but I don't think those difficulties,
serious as they are, are insuperable. It is a
difficult job, but it seems to me that the need
of additional revenues of the states makes
necessary some kind of effort of this kind, and
it is my conviction that, whether you get
federal legislation or what not, you are going
to be faced with just the type of problem
that Mr. Reynolds and you people are rais-
ing. It is a problem which is inherent in our
system of government: that the state tax col-
lection functions end at its boundary line,
and the only remedy that I see for it is along
the line of the very splendid step that has
been taken by North Carolina. That legisla-
tion, alone, would be of immense value in all
the states. I think it can go much farther,
but it is an extremely encouraging thing.
North Carolina has certainly done something.
MR. SMITH (Georgia): I am glad to hear
that.
MR. WIMSEY (Illinois): Professor Tray-
nor, if you had a mail order house in Califor-
nia which was shipping out to Nevada, for
retail consumption, you say there would be
no tax on the merchandise so shipped?
PROFESSOR TRAYNOR: No. This act applies
only to goods which are consumed in the
State of California.
MR. WIMSEY: It applies to Sears-Roebuck
and concerns of that kind, outside of the
state, which are shipping goods into the state ?
PROFESSOR TRAYNOR: Yes, that is right.
MR. - : Let us assume that I am a
resident of California and I import a fur
coat from, let us say, Marshall Field & Com-
pany, Chicago; and let us assume further
that they have no local branch in California.
If I follow the law, as a practical matter, I
will make a return and pay the tax on the
fur coat ?
PROFE.SSOR TRAYNOR: Yes.
MR. - : Purely from administrative
standpoint, suppose I don't. Do I ever hear
from it again? What efforts are made toward
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enforcement ? Is there a check made of the
receipt of the fur coat by me from Chicago?
I am purely interested in enforcement and
administrative efforts. Is there any attempt
made to run me down?
PROFESSOR TRAYNOR: Well, our Act has
just been in effect one quarter. We haven't
audited the accounts of people like that. I
think much can be done in the way of getting
reports from express companies and railroad
companies and from investigations by the
investigators and administrators in the em-
ploy of the Board. As to many small things
-say like jewelry and so forth-I imagine
there will be much evasion-tax avoidance-
but it won't be the first tax that has been
avoided. Inherent in the nature of it, it has
the difficulty which you mention.
Merchants Co-operate
MR. : Professor Traynor, have the
mail order companies sought to defeat the
purpose of this Act or are they co-operating
with you?
PROFESSOR TRAYNOR: Yes, they are co-op-
erating.
MR. : You are getting returns from
branch offices of, say, Sears-Roebuck and
Montgomery Ward?
PROFESSOR TRAYNOR: Yes, sir.
MR. FORT (Tennessee): I just want to say,
Mr. President, that we have a use tax in Ten-
nessee, applicable to tobacco. It was passed
in July and it is working very well so far.
MR. PIERCE: There has been a good bit of
discussion about the return from the branch
in California. I think we will have to clarify
that.
There is only one return, of course, made
normally by any such corporation which may
have a series of offices, of course, in California,
but has its principal place of business, say, in
Illinois. It makes a consolidated return. The
home office reports for the entire business
that it does for its branch offices in interstate
commerce, and the form of our return is such
that it really requires that to be done.
I have one of those forms here and it may
serve to illustrate the method employed.
The return is entitled "Sales and Use Tax
Return." Every one of these firms, of course,
has to make a sales tax return.. So -it auto-
matically gets this form. After the usual sales
tax items, there appears, down here as an
additional item, this: "Computations of use
tax required to be collected from consumer,"
and, then: "Total sales price of tangible per-
sonal property sold for storage,' use or other
consumption in California and exempt from
the retail sales tax as sales in interstate com-
merce or sales made outside this state." So
that specific question is asked every retailer
who does business in California and, if he
makes a correct return, he has to put some-
thing down there if he actually did it, and,
of course, as Professor Traynor said, all of
these returns are subject to our audit.
There is, of course, a very definite, practical
difficulty, to which he referred, that, in the
event accurate accounts of these out of state
shipments are not kept in California and the
taxpayer should deny us access to its records,
kept outside the state, our authority to go
outside the state is, of course, as you know,
exceedingly limited, but, if we were to have
some sort of co-operation, for example, from
the state of origin, as would be possible under
the North Carolina statute, that difficulty
would be met. However, quite aside from
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that, it isn't as difficult as it might appear for
the reason that we have very definite juris-
diction over the type of records to be kept by
persons who are liable for the sales tax or the
use tax as long as they are subjected to ourjurisdiction at all and, as he has indicated to
you, there has been no great difficulty.
Large Collection Indicated
Now, I suppose that you are all wondering,
of course, what does it really pay ? What is
it producing ? The revenue, naturally, would
not be comparatively as large for the first
quarter as you might anticipate later, but,
even for the first quarter-that would be for
the three months of July, August and Septem-
ber of this year-we have actually collected,
thus far, considerably over three hundred
thousand dollars from the use tax alone and,
at that rate, it is very easy to see that the
total collection will be at least a million and
a half a year. I think it will be much nearer
two million per year, conservatively. So,
while that might seem something of a drop
in the bucket as compared to our sales tax
collections, which are in the neighborhood of
sixteen million dollars a quarter, it is still a
substantial item, and one reason why the
sales tax collections have held up so well dur-
ing the last quarter, I am reliably informed, is
because of the operation of the use tax. A
good many items that I think would not be
reflected in the sales tax are there just be-
cause we have a use tax.
So from every standpoint it isn't merely an
experiment in the great unknown, but we
are actually doing something that we set out
to do. We do not, of course, feel that it is an
ideal form of taxation, for the very reasons
that have been indicated: that is, that it is
difficult to get returns from individual con-
sumers who buy from merchants without
places of business in California, but, between
that horn of the dilemma and the dilemma of
having our local merchants deprived of a lot
of business because of the circumstance that
we are unable to reach that type of interstate
trade at all, we think that the difficulty in
enforcement is to be preferred.
Links with Sales Tax
MR. DoYAL (Georgia): From your expe-
rience with it, you wouldn't think it would
.be a practical tax, from an administrative
standpoint, unless you did have a general
sales tax, would you? Suppose you just sim-
ply had the use tax. Wouldn't the cost of
administration of just that tax alone be pro-
hibitive ?
PROFESSOR TRAYNOR: I think it would be
really more effective in connection with the
sales tax. It couldn't work otherwise any-
where outside the state.
MR. BRowN (Missouri) : In our state, re-
cently, a man from Blue Rock, Ohio, bought
an automobile in the State of Missouri. We
claimed that he should have paid us a tax and
he did pay us a tax on an eight hundred and
eleven dollar purchase. The sale was consum-
niated within the state and we claimed it was
taxable. Suppose that the State of Ohio had
a use or consumer's tax. This automobile is
to be used in Ohio. Would Ohio or would
you in California, say, collect a use tax on
that ?
PROFESSOR TRAYNOR: Yes, we, in Califor-
Aia, the way our statute is now written, would
collect the use tax. There would be a double
tax. In Washington there is provision made
for that. That problem is essentially analo-
gous to the problem that comes up in double
taxation in income tax, for example, where
residents are taxed upon income from all
sources and non-residents from sources within
the state. A non-resident is taxable upon the
income that he earned in California. In the
income tax laws, there is a provision that
guards against it. Something like that, I
think, should be worked out in this Act, but,
writing a statute and getting all of the
wrinkles out of it the first time you write it,
then taking it from the typewriter to a Com-
mittee on Revenue and Taxation and getting
it out of there with all of these things in it,
is another matter, too. On some of those
ideas that we had it wasn't so easy to con-
vince a busy Legislature during the hurried
days of the close of the session.
I think that you have put your finger on
a very important point. We do not want to
have double taxation. All we want to do is
put our retailers upon equal terms with out-
of-state retailers. Something should be done
to avoid double taxation if this use tax idea
is to spread.
MR. - : May I ask one more ques-
tion? You mentioned a while ago that you
have access to the express companies' books.
PROFESSOR TRAYNOR: I think that access
could be obtained as an accommodation to
our state.
MR. : How about parcel post and
the mails ?
PROFESSOR TRAYNOR: No, sir, I don't think
we could get access to those.
Russian Sales Tae
Numerous and Hig
Sales tax administrators who believe
they are having a hard time making
people "enjoy" paying their pennies may
rejoice that they do not have the job of
making Russian sales taxes popular.
Paul Haensel, writing in The Tax
Magazine, reports tax rates on many
articles in Russia. Here are some samples:
Toilet soap, 69 to 72%.
Cigarettes, 79.3 to 91%; cigars, 72%;
tobacco, 79.3 to 80%.
Salt, 66% and higher in some cases;
butter 26%.
Kerosene, 90.5% in cities and 93% in
villages.
Ice cream, 33%; ice cream containing
eggs, 26%.
Ready-made clothing, 3.5%; knit wear,
38%.
Mirrors, 40%; china, 8%.
Sports goods, 21%; rayon goods, 71%;
trunks, 25%.
Vodka, 88.8%.
INDIANA CHAIRMAN WELCOMES VISITORS
By PHILIP ZOERCHER
Chairman, Indiana State Board of Tax
Commissioners, and President of
The National Tax Association
Mr. President and Members of the Na-
tional Association of State Tax Admin-
istrators:
It gives me a great deal of pleasure to
welcome you to the State of Indiana, some-
times known as the "Crossroads of America."
Of course, I know you people from the
West think that we are a little presumptu-
ous in thinking that Indiana is the cross-
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roads, but, if you listen to our radio pro-
grams, you will find that that is what they
have designated the State of Indiana. In-
dianapolis is the "Crossroads of America."
Certainly there is nothing of greater im-
importance to the people of every state
than the question of taxation and with it,
of course, goes the administration of these
different tax measures.
A great deal of good can come from
meetings of this kind. Different states have
different methods and there may grow a
unanimity of spirit and feeling if we get
together and discuss these matters.
There is another thing that we tax men
know. As I sometimes tell our own people,
our own field men, when they come to ie,
there are two ways of approaching the
public, the taxpayer. You can approach
him with a frown or you can approach him
with a smile and you can leave the. ta-
payer in a better spirit if you adopt the
latter than if you adopt the former; that is,
if you smile. You can be just as deter-
mined and just as firm in what you"saI.
and sometimes the taxpayer will go a
with a different spirit, and I know,'frosi
the looks of you folks here, that youa'
that class and believe in that spirit.
I hope and trust that you will have a
very successful meeting and it is use pQ
me to tell tax men that, if you
different opinion from that expressed kv
anyone, don't hesitate to express it beoft
by differences of opinion, in gettingt
we will iron out our difficulties and,,
real system of taxation in our
states.
Thank you, Mr. President. (A
